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1.
Introduction
Since the treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, when the dread of
Turkey as a military power in Europe ceased, interest in this
power has been mostly diplomatic and selfish. various nations
have desired to use her as a political machine against the grow-
ing power of Kussia or Austria, and have made certain attempts to
strengthen and reform her organization in order to accomplish
this purpose. However, the general desire among the great powers
has "been to push Turkey hack from Europe, and little has been
done "by them for the real benefit of the Empire. It will be the
attempt of this paper to show the true condition of the Ottoman
Empire about the end of the eighteenth century; and to discuss
the efforts toward reform from within, —the attempts made by the
Turks themselves to regain the prestige and power of the Empire*—
especially the heroic and much opposed reforms of the Sultan
seliin III.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013
http://archive.org/details/ottomanempirerefOOIanc
2.
Chapter I
The Ottoman Empire—Extent and Population
i'he Ottoman Empire at the time of Selim III covered large
portions of three continents. European Turkey included ureece,
present European Turkey, ^Ibania, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro,
.Bosnia, Herzegovina, and most of the Koumanian country, then
known as the provinces of Wall8chia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia,
extending to the .Dniester itiver on the northeast. 1 This terri-
tory, exclusive of the Danubien principalities, was divided into
five provinces, or eyalet
s
.
tfoumelia, .Bosnia, Silistria, igezair,
and urete. These were again divided into various pashaliks and
districts. In Asia the Empire included Asia Minor, Armenia,
Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, and parts of Arabia. This was
were
divided into a great number of provinces, among whichA Anatolia^
p
Bagdad, Syria, Erzeroum, Sivas, idarbekr, ^leppo, and van. In
Africa
^
Turkey held Egypt and uyrenaica during part of this per-
iod, Tripoli W8S nominally tributary, and Tunis and Algeria were
theoretically subject.
These lands were held with varying degrees of control, cor-
responding in general to the distance from uonstantinople. The
4
Empire might be divided broadly into five classes of territory;
first the body of lands directly administered from the capital,
such as Koumelia; second the lands less directly administered and
under special regulations, as Kurdistan; third, the tributary pro-
1. Miller: Ottoman Empire.
2. Creasy: Ottoman Turks', II, p. 314.
3. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 15.
4. Lybyer: Ottoman Empire, p. 28.

3.
vinces, such as Moldavia and wallachia; fourth, the protected
or vassal states, as the Ionian Islands; and fifth, neutral ter-
titory outside, such as the territory "between the jjoug and the
Dnieper divers before the treaty of daasy in 1792. Turkey was
in a period of disintegration at this time; the independence of
so many of her provincial governors, the fact that the ruler of
Georgia had recently become an acknowledged vassal of Russia,
and the fact that Kussis had a right to interfere in the admin-
istration of Moldavia and wallachia are manifestations of this
condition.
^
it is difficult to secure definite information on the pop-
ulation of the Empire, wo count was made, and means of estimat-
ing are scarce. An estimate quoted in 1817 gives the number as
7
25,330,000, but we do not know to what extent this includes the
peoples in those areas which were nominally dependent on Constan-
tinople but which were actually independent.
The Empire may have been much depopulated about the end of
the eighteenth century due to the great amount of plague and
„ •
8
famine.
Wo such thing as an Ottoman nation had ever been created.
Through their churches the christians had maintained their nation-
alities apart from their conquerors, and the Turks had made no
attempt to mix with their conquered subjects because of their
5. ureasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 310.
6. jttussia had obtained this right of interference at the treaty
of Kainarji in 1774. Kussian ministers at Constantinople were
permitted to remonstrate in **** favor of these provinces. Ar-
ticle ivl, sect. 10.
7. walpole: Memoirs, p. 15."
8. Eton: Survey, p. E90.
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intense prejudice against the christian religion.
The Turks are the the followers of Mohammed who use the
language ofATatarian conquerors of the countries. They had al-
ways been the actual masters of the Empire, and they claimed su-
periority on the ground of conquest and religion. 9
The u-reeks were the most important christian people. They
had a small compact country inhabited almost entirely by their
own group. The creeks combined an aptitude for business and a
live of book learning. Writers about the end of the eighteenth
century had very varied opinions concerning the character ^nd the
abilities of this race. 10
There was a considerable difference between the Constanti-
nople creeks and those in c-reece proper. Those in Constantino-
ple were especially crafty and fraudulent, and had a superior
talent for intrigue. "There is in a suburb called the thenar,
a race of creeks who call themselves nobles, and affect to despise
those of the islands; they are certain opulent families, from
which are generally appointed the dragomens of the porte, and the
waywodes of Wallaehia and Moldavia They are continually
intriguing to get those in office removed, and obtain their places.
.... They are all people of very good education, and are po-
d, Eton: survey, p. 11.
10. Thornton had a very low opinion of the creeks, and criticized
Eton's strong praises of them. {Thornton: Present state of
Turkey). Eton certainly overrated them, but Thornton seems
quite prejudiced against all of the christian peoples of the
Turkish Empire. He says of the inhabitants of vyellachiri and
Moldavia, who were Koumanians of the Creek urthodox f^ith,
"The modern inhabitants, instead of the rude and h^rdy vir-
tues which distinguished their barbarian ancestors, instead
of the dignified manliness which constituted the Rom^n char-

5lite, "but haughty, and vain, and ambitious to a ridiculous de-
gree They have in general all the vices of the Turks
"rt>« vii
o~
A
seraglio. There were numerous other races, Christian and
Musselman, as well as a great number of Jews, scattered through-
out the empire. The important Christian races were to be found
principally in Europe, and included the Bulgarians, the Alban-
ians, the Roumanians, the Servians, and certain other Slavic
races. The Arabs composed a large part of the Asiatic population.
North of these were several other wandering, pastoral peoples,
such as the Kurds and the Turcomans. They were all an unsettled
12
and generally a plundering people. The principal non-Mussel-
man nations in Asia were the Armenians, who were Christians, and
the Jews, who were also scattered throughout Europe.
10. (Continued J acter, retain only a stubbornness in refusing
what they know will be wrested from them, an obstinacy in
witholding what they dare not defend."
— Present State of Turkey, II, p. 327.
11. Eton: Survey, p. 331.
12. "The Turcomans are a wandering set of people, who, in the win-
ter months, migrate from the northern part of Asia Minor, and
during that period occupy with their numerous flocks, the
plains of Antioch In the same manner as the Bedouins,
they are divided and subdivided into tribes and families.. . .
The Turcomans are a numerous race of people.
"
—Walpole: Journeys, p. 339.

6.
Chapter II
The Government of the Empire
The government of the Ottoman Empire was essentially a
theocratic absolute monarchy. It was subject to the direct per-
sonal control of the Sultan, who was a "temporal autocrat," and
the most generally recognized "successor" of the Prophet, and
consequently the spiritual head of the Moslem world. The govern-
ment was neither entirely military nor a theocracy, but had fea-
tures of both.^" It was a despotism in that it was founded by
force, and upheld by force, but there was also in its authority
a certain amount of appeal to reason, "the reason, indeed, of a
nation that bounds investigation by the precepts of the Koran."
The spiritual and temporal authority of the head of the
government is shown by the titles imam and sultan . These titles
are equivalent to Emperor of Islamism, Pontiff of Musselmans,
and Protector of the j?aith. The imam is supposed to be of the
tribe of the Koreish, but this difficulty was said to be over-
come by the surrender of povsrer by the last caliph, 8 dependent
of this house, to Selim I and his descendents. Submission to the
sultan, both as spiritual and temporal chief, was universal in
theory though not in practice.
"The theoretical absolutism of the sultan had always been
tempered by traditional usage, local privilege, the juridical
and spiritual precepts of the koran and its ulema interpreters,
1. Eton: Survey, p. 17.
£. Thornton: Present State,' I, p. 88.
3. Thornton: Present State, I. p. 88.
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and the privy council." authorities differ in regard to the
extent to which the sultan was really bound by any authority, but
all seem to recognize that he was restrained somewhat by the re-
5ligion or, at least, by the religious forms.
4. Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th, XXVI I,p. 427.
5. "It is merely by the koran, or their religious institutes, his
sovereignty exists; the moment he abandons those doctrines,
or violates those laws, he becomes an infidel, and ceases to
be the lawful sovereign. .... That even the sultan thinks
himself bound by law is evident from his practice; for, on
any treaty to be made, any war to be undertaken or transgress-
ions punished that are committed against himself, or by per-
sons of high rank in his service, be applies to the mufti for
his decree, his decision, or sanction of law."
—Porter: Observations— p. 88, p. 104.
"absolute as the Turkish sultans are, they feel themselves
circumscribed both by religion, the principle on which their
authority is founded, and by the army, the instrument which
they must employ.
"
—Dr. Robertson, quoted by Thornton: Present State, I,
p. 93.
But Thornton believes the power of the sultan was little re-
strained. "The Mohammedan religion inculcates the reciprocal
duties to be observed by the prince and his subjects; but,
though it teaches, it cannot enforce a just administration of
government. The only conditions imposed upon the sultan are
the profession of the Mohammedan faith, and conformity to the
ceremonial of the Mohammedan church; and although the practice
of every regal virtue be more consistent with these duties,
yet they are not incompatible with the exercise of the most
atrocious tyranny His power is restricted only in
the observance of the religious institutions; for in civil
and political matters, the law admits such a latitude of
interpretation, that his will alone is sovereign, and is sub-
ject neither to control nor censure."
—Thornton: Present State, I, p. 94, p. 110.
The sultan did little actual administrating. He still held
g
a tribunal once a week, but it was of little consequence. let not
only the executive but the legislative power essentially resided
in the sovereign. Imperial decrees were subject to his revision
6. Thornton: Present State, i, p. 172. 1 "

8.
and were in force only during his pleasure. 7 *
The sultan had a most arbitrary power over the lives and
property of his officers. He might depose and banish the mufti
or any other officer, and although the law forbade the killing of
any member of the ulema
.
this had sometimes been done? The sultsn
was the Jawful heir to all the property of his officers except
that of the ulema . He was restricted in regard to the property
of others, but it was easy to avoid restrictions, and he often se-
cured wealth by ruining a subject through some pretext or supposed
crime.
*
The matter of succession in Turkey was regulated in a manner
quite peculiar to that Empire. The crown fell not to the eldest
son, but to the eldest male relative of the sultan, although the
relationship might be quite distant. Due to the system of plural
marriages there were usually a large number of heirs, and these
had always been feared by the sultan. Formerly most of them were
10
killed, but after 1603 the sultan's own sons were shut up in
"cages" and carefully watched, although certain other children of
royal blood were executed.'1"'1"
Selim III, as sultan, was probably above the average of his
line. He did not have the fierce warlike vigor of many of his
7. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 110.
8. Ibid., p. 130.
9. Eton: Survey, p. 28.
10. "'Sedition is worse than slaughter, 1 says the koran . and act-
ing on that adage, the sultan of Turkey for centuries provided
against revolution by putting out of the way every male heir who
could possibly be a candidate for the throne."
—Lane-Poole: Turkey, p. 49.

9.
predecessors, but he was of sufficient force to stand out from
the inefficient, lazy, and cruel sultans of the century. He came
to the throne a young man, active in person and energetic in
12
manner, and he was a man of considerable ability.
The other officers of the empire might be divided roughly
into three groups: the civil and administrative officers; the
doctors of^aw; and the governors and other local officers.
The chief officer in all temporal affairs, both civil and
military, was the grand vizier. He presided over the political
affairs of the empire, and was restrained only by the will of the
sultan, and by the religious laws. He had power of life and
death over the subjects of the sultan, but he was bound to observe
a certain procedure, and the people, as well as the sultan, held
him accountable for the proper administration of the army and home
affairs. 13
Under the grand vizier there was a sort of cabinet, which
consisted of the kiaya bey , who attended to the home department
and the war office, the reis effendi . whose special province was
foreign affairs, and the tchaush bashi . or Lord High Marshal, who
was vice president of the vizier's judicial tribunal, and chief
14
of the police force of the capital. Besides these there were
11. "The sultans frequently give in marriage to pashas princesses
of the Imperial family; but the male children of such mar-
riages are put to death as soon as they are born"
—Eton: Survey, p. 101.
12. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 294.
13. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 142.
14. Greasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 322.
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the nishan.jis . or secretaries, the defterdars , or treasurers, and
other officers, one of the more important of whom was the Inter-
preter of the Imperial Divan, who was usually a European, or a
Phanariote.
The grand vizier presided over the divan, or council of state,
which was called on state occasions to discuss measures, and which
was supposed by some to be a check on the sultan's power; hut it
was an advisory body only. It consisted of the great military
officers, the heads of the ulema
,
and the principal ministers.
The second group of officers consisted of the "uleme
.
or
body of lawyers, and their chief, the mufti , or high priest, to
whom was intrusted the exposition of the Mohammedan law in all
18
its branches." The mufti was next in spiritual rank to the sul-
tan, who as caliph, was the religious chief of all Sunnite mo-
1 9
hammedans. The ulema was a body of great dignity and honor,
and it also was supposed to be a check on the sultan; but it had
little actual power. The sultan had to submit certain of his
decrees and laws to the muft
i
.
who, with the advice of the other
members of the ulema
.
decided whether or not they conformed with
the precepts of the koran ; and that gave this officer an oppor-
tunity to pass on them. But if his ideas did not agree with
the sultan's, the sultan had only to place some one else in his
office; and, as all of the members of the ulema aspired to the
position of mufti, they usually saw to it that their ideas agreed
15. Lane-roole: Turkey, p. 327.
16. i^ton: Survey, p. 23.
17. The mufli was also called the sheik- el-islam . He should
not be confused with the muft is who were the councillors
to judges throughout the empire.
18. Eton: Survey, p. 19.
19. Greasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 322.
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with those of the sultan. 20 The uleme had to consent to all
treaties, but the sultan could force them in this also by de-
posing the mufti .
This group, although they were spiritual chiefs, must be
distinguished from the imams , or immediate ministers of religion,
who did not belong to the ul ema , and whose services were confined
22
to the mosques.
The members of the ulema had certain privileges: they were
exempt from taxation, and they were the only officers of the gov-
ernment whose property was hereditary in their families. The
23
offices, however, were hereditary in the order only.
The third or local class of officers consisted of the pro-
vincial governors of varying rank. The greater governments were
given to lieutenants called beylerbeys (prince of princes ), and
the lesser provinces to pashas
,
beys
,
and aghas
. The various
divisions differed greatly in size, but the offices were usually
unequal in dignity only, not in power. The power of the govern-
ors depended usually on their personality, or on the situation
of their provinces, or on special circumstances. The governors
were not appointed, as formerly, from among the sultan's slaves,
who would feel absolute dependence upon him, 2^ but the positions
were now bought, and often held for long periods. This fact was
a main source of the degenerate condition of the empire.
20. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 134.
21. ibid., p. 135.
82. ibid., p. 122.
Ibid., p. 127, 128.
24. ibid., p. 155.
25. walpole: Memoirs, p. 4.

12.
The religion of the Turks had such a close relation to their
life and their government that it is impossible to survey their
political institutions without touching on the relation of Islam
to the government. These two institutions touch at every point.
The sultan held his power through the authority of the religion,
and the government took its form from the same source. (The Mo-
hammedan church recognizes no form of government hut monarchy,
and admits no division of authority,). The law was founded ab-
solutely on the koran and was contained largely in that book;
and the foreign policy of the empire was determined largely by
the religious prejudices of the people.
It was in the law especially that the intimate relation
between religion and government was shown. The fundamental law
was the koran itself, the respect to which was due to its sup-
posed divine origin. J<'rom this was derived a code of laws, called
the multeka , which related to religious, civil, criminal, politi-
27 28
cal, and military affairs. To these were added certain com-
mentaries called the durer or halebi , and besides these there
were various collections of the fetwas or the decrees of the
£9
mufti. The original theological law contained a few general
26. The Turks sometimes broke treaties with Christian powers find
justified this action on religious grounds. But this point
has probably been made too much of by such writers as Eton.
He says, "The Turks had no respect for treaties made with
Christian nations. The ulema is quoted as saying that 'a
treaty made with the enemies of God and his prophet might be
broken, there being nothing so worthy a Mohammedan as to un-
dertake the entire destruction of the Christians.'"
—Eton: Survey, p. 105.
27. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 107.
28. "Suleiman charged Sheik. Ibrahim Halebi with the task of pre-
paring a code; and the result, prepared before 1549, was the

13.
precepts, though it by no means prescribed the form or mode of
government in its minute branches; and it expressly conceded to
the legislation of the prince an absolute authority on all mat-
ters which did not relate to the belief or the practical duties
30
of religion. The first caliph took advantage of this to es-
tablish the procedure and forms of government and to create the
31
code.
It was not the laws of the Ottoman Empire, but their misuse,
-
the corruptions practiced under them, --that gained for the empire
its reputation for injustice anu cruelty. The administration of
justice, while formally not differing materially from that of some
of the more enlightened nations of Europe, in reality was despotic
arbitrary, and, at least from the point of view of the Christian,
unjust.
The hakim , or departments of justice, were divided into the
28. (Continued) Multeka ol-ebhar
.
.... which remained the foun
dation of Ottoman la?/ until the reforms of the nineteenth
century.
"
Lybyer: Ottoman Empire, p. 153.
29. Eton: Survey, p. 30.
30. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 110.
31. "The Koran
,
containing political institutions as well as re-
ligious dogmas was probably sufficient to regulate the civil
affairs of Mohammed's first followers But when they
became more numerous, and their dominion was spread over many
opulent and extensive regions, . . . .law digesters arose,
who, now finding the doctrines of the koran insufficient for
the great end of government, viz. the preserving of good or-
der, and the well being of civil society, have remedied its
defects without appearing to derogate from its authority, or
risking to alienate the least part of ±ha.t implicit obedience,
and profound veneration, the people paid to it, for under
pretense of forming commentaries, as a single extension of
the angel's or the prophets ideas, they have provided codes
of civil law."
—Porter: Observations, p. 50.
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the ministers of justice and executors of laws. Procedure was
quite simple in civil cases. Each party presented his case; two
witnesses were necessary; the matter was summed up hastily, and
33
the judge proclaimed the sentence. He might consult the koran
or the multeka . Usually the decision where both parties were
Musselmen was unbiased, hut this varied with the judge. 34 Yet in-
justice was most common for various reasons. j?'alse witnessing
was an open profession, ?nd written testimony was considered of
no avail against spoken. Investigation was too quick and was of-
ten inaccurate. The winner had to pay the cost of the suit, and
a Turk would often start a suit against a Christian as a means of
extorting money. Sometimes the abilities of the Turkish judges
to decide in favor of those who had paid or could pay him the
36
most was quite noticeable.
Then certain civil cases, those in which the state was a
party, seem to have been excluded from the judicial forms. They
were almost wholly in the hands of the sultan, or his agents.
In criminal cases there was practically no trial at all and
rzri
criminal executions were frequent.^' There was the utmost bar-
barism in the means of execution, and torture was frequent to
extort confession. Criminal justice was often bought off.
32. "It is not their laws, but the corrupt administration of them,
the flagitious venality of their judges, and the number of
false witnesses connived at, and whose testimony is accepted,
that is the opprobrium of the Turkish empire."
—Porter: Observations, p. 84.
33. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 190.
34. Ibid., p. 195.
35. ibid.
,
p. 202.
36. Eton: Survey, p. 31.
37. Thornton: Present State, I. p. 204.
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The great point in which the Turkish law differed from that
of most of the European nations was that it was personal rather
than territorial. Peoples of various religions in the empire
lived under different laws. 38 In some regions all were of one
religion and therefore obeyed one law, hut in other places there
was a great variety. To know something of this varying relation
of Moslem subjects, christian subjects, and foreign residents to
the government is of the utmost importance in understanding the
administration of the empire.
The Turks had never forced their religion on their conquered
subjects, but had allowed their political body to be divided, and
had even encouraged institutions which deepened the division be-
tween conquerors and conquered. The Christians were given an
almost separate administration, but they were never allowed to
feel themselves in any other position than that of conouered and
oppressed subjects. The real worth of the past5. iks was consid-
ered to be in proportion to the number of nonjlusselmcn subjects,
because they had to pay a certain tribute, and the governor might,
without having anything to fear therefrom, abuse his power and
extort great sums from them. Over the Musselman subjects
40
the administration was light and usually just, but the welfare
38. Lybyer: Ottoman Empire, p. 34.
39. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 157.
40. "To the Musselraan inhabitants, who are protected by the civil
or military associations to which they are united, and whose
complaints can always reach the throne, no jurisdiction can
be more mild and paternal, no government more humane. The
Turk, as well as the tributary cultivators, pay a quit rent,
in consideration of which, the Turks at least, are free and
independent their conduct is under no control but

of the Christien depended merely on the personal character of
his provincial governor, and his only protectors were the clergy
of the Greek church, and these as well as the Turks, might he
oppressors.
The Christians of European Turkey were all assigned to the
jurisdiction of the Greek patriarch who resided at Constantino-
ple. The language of church and schools was Greek, and out-
wardly the Christian peoples were united and were generally called
Greeks "by foreigners or by the Turks. But the Serbs and Bul-
garians considered the Greek patriarch as much a foreigner as
they did the Mohammedan clergy, and they were never reconciled
41
to the arrangement. The patriarch, as well as the other high
clergy, was usually chosen from the Phanariotes, and had to buy
his see. The clergy were often the allies of the pashas and
their interests were therefore rather in the oppression than in
42the protection of the Christian subjects. The clergy were given
temporal authority, and the jurisdiction of the patriarch ex-
tended to a considerable part of the civil law, to questions of
marriage, divorce, and inheritance where Christians only were
concerned. By the treaty of Kainardji, Russia had been given
a certain right of protection over the Greek church, 43 and on
this she later based a claim to jurisdiction over all the Chris-
tian people of the empire. This jurisdiction was not recognized
by Turkey, but was used by Russia as a justification of inter-
ference and aggression on her part.
40. (Continued) that of partial and indulgent law."
--Thornton: Present State, I, p. 157.
41. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 25.
1 42. Thornton: Present State. II. p. 299.
li
17.
Foreign residents in Turkey were under the laws of their
respective countries; and in all matters in which Turkish sub-
jects were not concerned, they were amenable to the tribunal
presided over by the consul of their country. In questions which
related to landed property, foreigners were amenable to the
Ottoman civil courts. Turkey recognized the passports issued
by foreign governments when these passports had been duly coun-
tersigned by a Turkish consul or minister.^
The public revenues of the Empire fall into into three great
divisions: the miri
.
or public treasury; the hazne
.
or private
fortune of the sultan; and vakf, or the revenue consecrated to
' A———'
the service of public worship or charitable institutions. The
surplus funds of the vakf formed a reserve which was occasionally
45
applied to the government's use in time of distress.
The sources of revenue of the public treasury included direct
and indirect t.uxes. The haratch or khora.j
.
or capitation tax,
was a poll tax levied on all male adult rayahs (Christians and
Jews). The amount was not equal, for the same amount was levied
on each province as formerly, and this amount was divided among
the inhabitants and varied greatly according as the number of
inhabitants had changed. There was a territorial impost or tax
43. Treaty of Kaiar j i--..rticle VII. 'The Sublime Porte promises
to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches,
and it also allows the Ministers of the Imperial court of Rus-
sia to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in
favor of the new church at Constantinople. ... as on be-
half of its officiating ministers, promising to take such
representations into cue. considerai ion, as being made by a
confidential functionary of a neighboring and sincerely friend-
ly Power."
—HollandiTreaty Relations of Turkey rnd Russia, p. 41
f
18
of one tenth on the produce of land, but the greater part of
this was detained by the provinces. Persons subject to the
haratch ^and women had to pay a personal property tax. customs
duties made up a small part of the public income. Then the
public treasury was augmented by monopolies, such as wheat, which
was received from the provinces at low rates and sold out to
bakers. The provinces most fertile in grain were subject to the
istria
,
a contribution equal to one half the produce, ilso Walla-
chia and Moldavia were forced to sell sheep, butter, and other
products to agents of the government at prices set by the govern-
ment. The princes or governors of Wallachia and Moldavia paid
a tribute as a substitute for all other taxes; and yearly con-
firmed their title by purchase. Then taxes in kind were levied
on certain provinces for the purpose of keeping up the navy and
4- A
supplying the sultan's household.
The money in the public treasury was not supposed to be
spent by the sultan for his private use. It was expended mainly
for military purposes, the paying of the officers and workmen of
the arsenal, for ship-building, und for the defense of the cap-
ital. 47
The sources of the revenues of the hazne were the imperial
44. Monroe: Turkey, p. 139.
45. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 3.
46. Thornton: Present State, II, pp. 8-42.
47. Ibid., p. 43. Eton says (Survey, p. 45), "However, the report
of the expenditures for the year 1776 includes such items as
•Pay of people belonging to sultan's kitchen,' 'Pay of offi-
cers of sultan's palace,' 'Expenses of the kitchen 1 , etc."

19.
domains; presents from servants at certain festivals; payment
for nominations to offices; contributions in produce from certain
48provinces; revenues of mines; a duty of ten per cent on in-
49heritances; the inheritance and confiscation of the property
of government officers; and revenue from new appointments to fiefs.
The imperial domain consisted of lands that were not apportioned
in military fiefs, and the sultan and various members of his fara-
50ily had certain fiefs that were appropriated to them.
The keeping in condition of national establishments ^as
well as the maintaining of the army was imposed on the provin-
cial governors in the assignment of fiefs. The expenses of jus-
tice, police, public worship, building and maintaining forts,
bridges, and roads, were also imposed on the governors. ^
Most of the land of the Ottoman Empire was held on a mil-
itary feudal tenure similar to that of Western Europe in the
middle ages; the principal difference was that there were no
52
mesne lords but all land was held directly from the sultan.
Most of the land conquered by the Turks had been assigned to
feudal lords who had to agree totake up arms on the summons of
the sultan, to remain encamped as long as he ordered, and to main-
53tain a contingent of cavalry and infantry. They were supposed
to be deprived of revenue and rank if disobedient, but by this
time so many of the governors, and lesser fiefholders, had become
48. Thornton, Present State, II, p. 46.
49. Eton, Survey, p. 48.
50. Thornton, Present State, I, p. 223.
51. Thornton: Present state,. II, p. 2.
52. Ibid, I, p. 215.
53: Thornton, Present State, I, p. 221.
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partially or completely independent that they could seldom be
deposed for disobedience, tfiefs were theoretically not strictly
hereditary but in practice were usually conferred on the children
of fiefholders, and often on descendants of other subjects who
died in battle, the object being to encourage military service.
Some estates had been left in the hands of the families of the
original proprietors, who might go to war if they were Musselman,
or might pay a war tribute. *
The greater part of the army, therefore, was an extensive
militia, supported on the feudal plua. Each governor had charge
of the military administration of his own province. The beylerbeyg
5*5
were the commanders, and were subject only to the grand vizier.
It the declaration of war men were called out from the ages of
sixteen to sixty. Besides the national militia there were the
provincial troops which the pashas levied to serve in fortresses.
The most influential part of the military organization was
the body of professional soldiers called the janizaries. This
body of troops, who were closely organized, formed a sort of
caste as well as a standing army; and they mace a powerful or-
ganization which proved to be a real check on the sultan's power.
The first body of janizaries had been formed in 1362 and had been
composed of captive Christians trained to military service. Boys
were chosen for their athletic make and were carefully trained
and educated for the service. They were first placed in the
service of some pasha or prince, or bound out to some Musselman
peasant in order that they might strengthen their bodies in la-
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bour and learn Islam. Then they were admitted to the corps of
janizaries, but first they performed menial tasks and they were
not considered equal to the others until they had signalized
their courage in actual warfare.
Their organization was not very different from that of
European armies. In the time of Selim III they were divided
into about two hundred companies. The general, known as the
yenicheri aghasi
.
was a powerful man, and all promotions depended
58
on him. The troops were disciplined according to rules laid
down by the great Suleiman. In time of peace they guarded the
frontier and exercised the functions of police officers.^ 9
The janizaries had many privileges and opportunities. They
were exempt from the jurisdiction of the civil law and were
judged by their own officers. Many were on the rolls who were
not active, but who had enrolled merely to secure the privileges.
They were called yamaks and received no pay, but they were ex-
empt from the capitation tax. A8 rewards for service janizaries
were often raised to very high ranks—one even became grand viz-
60
ier. Estimates as to the numbers of these troops vary to such
6
1
an extent that no accurate opinion can be given.
54. Thornton, Present State, I, p. 221.
55. Ibid., 215.
56. Ibid., 245.
57. Ibid., 247.
58. Ibid., 227.
59. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 228.
60. Ibid., 247.
61. These estimates are not for precisely the same period but
in general for the last half of the eighteenth century and
it is hard to explain their variation:
Porter—200,000 or 300,000 Eton,— 113,400
E'Ohsson—120,000 Thornton— 40,000
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By the end of the eighteenth century the janizaries had
degenerated from an efficient, powerful, closely organized body
to a lawless and high-handed band of privileged soldiers, but
that they had by no means lost all their power was shown by the
fact that it was principally because of their opposition that
Selim was unable to carry through certain much needed reforms.
Their degeneracy may have been either the result or the cause
of the general degeneracy in the administration of the empire.
The former discipline had been relaxed and their laws were in-
sufficient to meet the present needs, yet they were prejudiced
against anything new. The sultans have been accused of trying
to lessen the power of the janizaries by substituting weak men
for their officers; but these attempts were probably merely per-
sonal, and were directed against certain leaders, rather than
6 2
with a conscious effort toward the weakening of the organization.
There were certain other classes of professional soldiers in
the empire, but their number was not large. There were the top -
gis, the gunners, or artillerymen, who received their pay from
and
the treasury of the prince, Awho were scattered throughout all
the fortresses and garrison towns of the empire. Then there were
the jebegis , or armourers, who guarded the arsenals and furnished
implements to the janizaries; and the sakkas. or water carriers,
who were really very important because of the nature of the coun-
try; and a body of professional cavalry*
61. (Continued) Peyssonnel—many million. De Tott---400, 000
Lybyer believes that the. number of real soldiers was only
62. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 238. | 12000.
63. Ibid., 251.
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The whole Turkish array wa? inefficient. Laxity of disci-
pline, inability of the commanders to plan a strategic campaign,
and the absence of up-to-date artillery and ammunition made the
Turks the losers in every war about this period. The force of
the Turkish empire was composed of the total mass of the Mussel-
man subjects, but was un formed, undisciplined and intractable;
"if compared to a European army, they were merely a disorderly
64
crowd." Their force lay in their attack but for that they
had to be prepared; if they were taken unawares, the smallest
6 S
number put them to flight. v Their ammunition was inadequate
6 6
and poorly made.
6 7
The Turkish navy had seldom amounted to much, although
for the past few years, due to the energy and foresight of the
late capudan pasha
.
Gazi Hassan, efforts had been made to make
it more efficient. At the accession of Selim there were about
seventeen warships^and part of these were lost in the war with
Russia. Then there were about twenty large vessels, celled
caravellas
,
which belonged to merchants, ana in time of war were
68
used by the government. Later the nuvy hud several good ships
64. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 64.
65. Eton: Survey, p. 66. "In short, it is a mob assembled rather
than an army levied None of those numerous details of
a well organized body, necessary to give quickness, strength,
and regularity to its actions, to avoid confusion, to repair -
damages; nothing the result of reasoning and combination; no
systematic attack, defense, or retreat; no accident foreseen,
or provided for."
--Eton: Survey, p. 67.
66. "Although the Ottoman -government be provided with an arsenal,
founderies for cannon, and other requisites for carrying on
war, such is the supineness, ignorance, or criminal negligence
of those who direct that department, that they are quite in-
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built on European plans, but they were manned by people unac-
customed to the sea. There was no plan for educating and train
ing seamen, the officers were not appointed for merit, and the
69
whole business of the ships was done by slaves.
66. (Continued) adequate to the purposes for which they were
intended. /mong other instances of the defective state of
their ammunition, I am creditably informed that, when the
vizier marched against the French, no bombs were ready, and
they were cast and sent off to the army, one hundred at s
time, warm from the furnace, to Uicomedia; that on their
arrival before El-Arish, the balls and shot were so bad,
that instead of making a breach in the wall, they were shat
tered as soon as they impugned on it."
—.From writings of V/. G. Browne in 1802 quoted by
Walpole: Travels, p. 153.
67. "Turkish forces on the sea have always been contempti-
ble. A force of 300 was baffled by one Imperial and four
Genoese ships in the siege of Constantinople."
— Thornton: Present State, I, p. 291.
68. Eton: Survey, p. 76.
69. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 294.
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Chapter III
Conditions Demanding Reform
Perhaps the statement that "the most prominent feature in
the Turkish establishments is abuse of power""*" was rather se-
vere; but certainly the fate of the provincials in the govern-
ment was very hard. Everything had to be bought, and the peas-
ants in the provinces were obliged to pay the price.
The pashas, or governors, had to pay a heavy price for their
appointment to office. They owed their places solely to the sul-
tan, who deposed or punished them without cause or trial, and who
2derived a regular revenue from the sale of offices. The govern-
ors usually had to borrow money to pay for the appointment and
it came to be like mortgaging the pashalik . They recouped them-
selves at the expense of the province. The agent of the money
lenders, who was usually a Greek or Armenian banker, often ac-
companied the pasha and was the reel ruler and oppressed the
people heavily. As a result taxes were heavy; often about one
4half of the people's income was paid to the government. The
revenues of the pashas were from rents on lands and imposts on
cities and villages. Means of collection varied and the govern-
ors had absolute power in this matter. Complaints ageinst the
governors might be directed to the sultan, but in order to do
any good they would have to be accompanied by more gold than he
1. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 86.
2. Ibid., 162.
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would pay for reappointment. To cite an instance: Hadim Oglou
had command of the Dardanelles; he was pasha and slso heredi-
tary chieftain, and one of the richest men in Turkey. He re-
ceived enormous bribes from Greek merchants who sailed under
on
the Russian flag and from others who carried contraband trade.
Complaints reached the capital of the smuggling, but he had spies
there who heard the news. The governor sent a lot of money to
some of the court favorites, and nothing more was heard Of the
7
matter. If the central government did punish the pashas, the
people received no benefit; because the government simply ap-
Q
propriated the confiscated wealth.
Appointment was supposed to be only for a year, although
reappointment could be bought in the same manner as new appoint-
ment. But the uncertainty of the office discouraged any attempts
on the part of the governor to improve the condition of his
qprovince or to govern his people benevolently. The succession
of a new governor might defeat all the plans of improvrnent sug-
gested or carried out by a former one, if he had made such an
attempt
.
3. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 318.
4. Miller: Ottoman empire, p. 18.
5. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 156.
6. Ibid., 185.
7. Walpole: Memoirs, p. 94.
8. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 380.
9. "Uncertain how long he may enjoy his present dignity, he is
regardless of Rai.ning the attachment or approbation of his
subjects; his time is not employed in projecting works of
public utility, or forming schemes for the general improve-
ment of the province, or for securing and facilitating the
intercourse between different parts of it,
—Walpole: Memoirs, p. 4
10. Ibid., p. 2E.
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The power of the inferior rulers was similar to that of the
pashas. And there were throughout the empire great numbers of
petty local tyrants who farmed the revenues of districts of vary-
11ing sizes. The custom of farming taxes was universal; the con-
tractor would advance all or part of the revenue to the central
government, and then would extort money from the peasants by any
12
means he could.
11. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 320.
12. "The revenues of a certain district, perhaps ten or twelve
villages, are to be disposed of. The person who wishes to
farm them, after ascertaining their value with all practi-
cal accuracy, goes to a minister, and offers what he thinks
proper for a terra of one, two, three, or four years. As the
government is always indigent, the offer of ready money is
generally accepted; and nothing more is required, to enable
the farmer to exercise unlimited authority over the district
in question, and to augment his revenue by every means of
fraud, violence, and extortion. Thus, what was originally
supposed to produce fifteen purses, he perhaps makes to
yield forty. The peasantry is thereby ruined, but this does
not embarrass him, who is concerned only with what the dis-
trict will yield during the term for which he holds it.. . .
The farmer must oppress in order to reimburse himself for
his enormous expenses, or he must fail. The peasant being
rated in proportion to the gross produce of the land he cul-
tivates, cannot possibly do more than glean a scanty subsist-
ence, which may be obtained by slight exertions and the most
wretched system of husbandry; and thus, whilst there is, on
the one hand, a strong positive motive to oppress, the stim-
ulus to production, on the part of the land holders, is the
most feeble and negative that can be imagined."
—From writings of W. G. Browne, in 1802^
quoted by Walpole : Travels, p. 150.
The oppression of the governors and the tax farmers was large
ly responsible for the economic distress of this period. The in-
equality of property was striking. The government officers, of
course, were the opulent ones, and the peasant class could not
raise themselves. The display of any wealth on the part of the
lower classes made them subject to extortion and plunder, and
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what property any of them might gain, he carefully concealed, and
lived in a most wretched condition. The empire had great resources
but the spirit of enterprise was checked by the insecurity of
property and the defects in the administration. Slow payment of
money and high rates of interest discouraged industry. The
pashas hoarded part of the money and thus withdrew it from cir-
culation. This increased the distress. There was a great decline
in the number of towns, but a far greater decline in the amount
of cultivated land; because many of the peasants flocked to the
towns, since there they were given some help, the governors being
afraid to allow famines in the towns. The land being uncultivated
bred disease, such as fevers and leprosy, which caused a decline
13
in the population, so that the country was further depopulated.
Since the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, the prestige of
the Porte"^ gradually declined, and the power of the local
governors had constantly increased, until at the time of Selim III
it presented a formidable problem to the government. There was
a tendency for the pashas to refuse military assistance to the
sultan and then try to make their provinces hereditary in their
families. k contemporary author wrote: "Governors of distant
provinces, availing themselves of the resources of the district,
have in frequent instances, so firmly established themselves as to
resist efficaciously the right of the sovereign to eject or dis-
possess them. When a pasha, from a sense of his own strength or
of the weakness of the government, aspires to independency he
13. Walpole: Memoirs, pp. 5-13.
14. So called from the building which contains the quarters of
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withholds the contributions due to the Porte: he however nego-
tiates while he threatens, and if the attempt fails of checking
his insolence by the interposition of an officer, the same of-
ficer is commissioned on the part of the sultan to confirm him
in his dignity, to sanction, and even to recompense his revolt by
15
conferring upon him additional honours." In some places the
power of the governor was so strong that the government made lit-
tle effort to oppose him, but in many places there was constant
civil warfare, and it is impossible to calculate the resulting
distress.
Revolt was the common practice among the chief pashas, but
there were some who, because either of the greatness of their
power, or the greatness of their province, became particularly
famous. The great pashalik of Bagdad had been in reality inde-
pendent, except for very short intervals, since the first part
of the eighteenth century. The sultan only confirmed the pasha.
The people and especially the soldiery of Bagdad chose him, and
he ruled with a despotic power, and paid no revenue at all for
his extensive province. Whenever there was a war with a European
power, and the pasha of Bagdad was called on to furnish his
quota of troops, he pretended that it was necessary to keep them
16
all at home to defend his province against the irabs.
14. (Continued) the vizier, foreign minister, minister of the
interior, and hall for the meeting of the council of state.
—Monroe: Turkey, p. 261.
But another writer claims that it was because a certain sultan
likened his empire to a tent and the government to the tent door.
—Davey: Sultan and Subjects, p. 122.
Porte means originally gateway. Sublime Porte is the French for
Turkish words meaning lofty gate.

In Egypt the trouble with the rebellious governors oarae to
e head in the reign of Selim III. The ruling power in Egypt
was in the h;inds of an official class known as Mamelukes, who
17
were disobedient and unsubdued. Their leaders, or beys
,
con-
trolled the government.
in Syria the power of the sultan was actually almost no-
19
thing. Here there were a great number of independent governors,
but none was strong enough to avoid constant warfare with neighbor-
ing pashas or with the Porte. In observant traveller wrote at this
period: "The weakness of the Turkish government cannot appear
15. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 163.
16. Eton: Survey, p. 279. ^ traveller through this country in
1758 wrote: "Basha Solyman is the chief commander at Eagdad un-
der the Grand Seignor, in effect, he is the supreme lord. him-
self of this part of the empire. He makes no remittances to
the Porte, but rather he yearly brings his master in debt for
repairs, or pretended repairs, of fortifications, support of
troops, etc. The Grand Seignor has more than once tried to
supercede him, but the Janizaries, of whom he has at least
40,000 under his command, would admit of no other master."
— Ives: "A Journey from Persia to England." p. 281.
17. Walpole: Memoirs, p. 23.
16. "All Egypt is independent. The pasha sent to Cairo is in ef-
fect a prisoner during his government, which is only nominal;
the Porte draws little or no revenue from it, and no troops
except a few fanatics in time of war with the Christians.
The Turks have at different times got possession of Cairo,
but never could maintain themselves in the government. . . .
The actual power resides in the Mamalukes, and the bey who
has most of them in his suite, and is consequently the most
powerful. As to the pasha sent by the Porte, he has at dif-
ferent times had more or less influence, but is in general
a mere cypher, obliged to submit to the will of the beys , who
dismiss him when they please. They have sometimes entirely
thrown off all appearance of submission to the Porte; and at
present as well as generally, their obedience is only nom-
inal. The tribute which Egypt ought to send the Porte is
frequently withheld, or, if transmitted, it is diminished by
deductions for the reparation of canals, fortresses, etc.,
at the will of the beys. "
--Eton: Survey, pp. 283--286
A.
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in a stronger light than in the province of Syria, almost the
whole of which is held by governors in a state of rebellion;
who have the resemblance, or so great a reality of power, that
the forces of the Porte are not deemed adequate to subdue them.
The mountains of Libanus and part of IntiLibanus
,
belong to a
family wholly independent of Constantinople. Djezzar, building
fortifications, and establishing himself as a little prince, bids
defiance to his enemies, the people of Tripoli depose and confirm
whom they please, as their governor. Between Damascus and Aleppo
one village is at war with another. ... On the gulf of Scand-
eroon, KutcihuK
-
J li, of Paras, has been declared a rebel, and is
the cause of the most serious alarm to the government." This
account does not vary rnaterailly from that of the other contem-
porary students of the empire. Another stated that "the pasha
of /,cre, who hus an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men, besides being
in possession of the strong country of the Druses, is perfectly
21independent of the Porte, as was his predecessor." Djezzar of
Acre refused tax and tribute, and put to death the sultan's mess-
22
engers. The pashas rivalled each other in lawlessness and in-
dependence.
In Europe there were a number of rebellious and independent
governors, though none with very great provinces. Passvan Oglou
of Viddin was perhaps the most celebrated. For many years he de-
fied the whole force of the sultan, and made invasion into ad-
19. Eton: Survey, p. 282.
20. Walpole: Travels, p. 330.
21. iston: Survey, p. XIX.
22. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 317.
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jacent provinces, like an independent and avowed foreign enemy.
24
fili Pacha had made good his independence in /.lbania. Aghas
in Macedonia resided in their castles surrounded by guards of
Albanians, and lived in a state of constant warfare with each
other, or with whoever might oppose them. 25 Throughout Turkey
there were mutinous lereditary feudal lords who styled themselves
dereh beys
,
or Lords of the Valleys; who were arrogant to the
26
sultan, and oppressive to their subjects.
Besides the rebellious governors there were throughout the
Empire groups of people—mostly smr.ll nationalities, who felt
themselves to be more or less independent of the Porte, and this
increased the decentralization of the Empire. In Greece the
Suliotes and other tribes to the north were practically inde-
pendent, and had become leagued, at the instigation of Catharine
27
of Russia, in active insurrection against the Turks. All Greece
stood in a rather special, privileged relation to the empire,
probably because the population was principally Christian, and
Christians everywhere were more or less autonomous. There was a
large amount of self-government in the towns of the Peloponne-
28
sus. Very great privileges were enjoyed in certain of the
islands, uhios had been allowed to retain her government as it
had been under the Genoese; and i'enos and JUaxos retained the
29
right to govern themselves. The Greek islands were only vis-
23. ureasy: Ottoman Turks, I, p. 317
24. Cambridge Modern History, IX, p. 385.
25. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 161.
26. (Jreasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 321.
27. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, I", p. 298.
28. Miller: Ottoman empire, p. 28.
29. Ibid., 28.
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ited by the Turks when the capitation money was collected. In
the mountain districts of Pindus and Olympus the christians
had the right of bearing arms, and they formed military commun-
31ities, called "free villages." un the peninsula of Chalkidike
there was a confederation of villages which elected local author-
ities. Athens was the private property of the sultan, who let
it out for life to the highest bidder, and the Athenians annu-
31
ally elected most of their local officers.
The Albanians had always stubbornly resisted Turkish rule,
32
and were governed by natives who had varying power over them.
Bosnia and Croatia obeyed the porte just when it suited them, and
the sultan reaped little benefit from them. 33 In Bosnia the
Turkish governor had become a mere figure-head, and all real
power was centered in the Bosnian noblemen who had gradually be-
come hereditary headmen. 34 Austrian dominion over Servia came to
an end in 1791 and the national spirit of the people began to be
30. Walpole: Memoirs, p. 20
31. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 29.
32. "Specimens of almost every sort of government are to be found
in Albania. Some districts and towns are commanded by one
man, under the Turkish title of boIu bashee ; others obey their
elders; others are under no subjection, but each man governs
his own family. The power in some places is in abeyance, and
although there is no apparent anarchy there are no rulers.
There are parts of the country where every £gha or bey is a
petty chieftain, exercising every right over the men of the
vi llage. The Jforte, which in the days of Ottoman greatness
divided the country into several small pashaliks and commander-
ies, is now but little respected, and the limits of her dif-
ferent divisions are confused and forgotten."
—Quoted from John Cain Hobhouse by Creasy: Otto-
man Turks, II, p. 322.
33. Eton: Survey, p. 285.
34. Miller: Ottoman Empire,' p. 21.
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aroused at that time
5
although there was no manifestation of re-
volt until several years later when the conduct of the janizaries
35drove the rayahx 3 to rebel.
Arabia did not acknowledge the sovereignty of the sultan,
except in a few towns. The Wahabites, a sect among the Arabs,
were the masters of practically all Arabia except Mecca and Medina
36
which they had not yet conquered. Throughout Syria there v/ere
a number of independent peoples. All the inhabitants of the
mountain district from Smyrna to Palestine, and in the mountains
in general throughout the empire, were perfectly independent and
37
were usually considered by the Porte as enemies.
This independence and semi-independence of the various peo-
ples and governors throughout the empire was 1? rgely responsible
for the general lav/less condition and hindrance to economic life.
The transportation of goods was slow on account of the possibil-
ity of being held up by fierce wandering tribes. A well informec
man, writing about 1803, says: ".At this time, there is no pro-
vince in Romelia, where troops of licentious banditti do not
annually intercept the caravans, interrupt communications, plun-
der the husbandmen, and desolate the country. "^^ Various writers
report that the conditions around Scanderoon were especially bad,
and that caravans on the way from Scanderoon to Aleppo were
obliged to go by the way of Antioch, as all the country through
35. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 454.
36. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 316.
37. Eton: Survey, p. 281 and Walpole: Memoirs, p. 19.
38. Walpole: Memoirs, p. 7. .
39. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 65.
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which the direct road led, belonged to the Kurds, who would not
allow the Turks to pass it. 40
The rebellious state of the provinces was only partially
the cause of the lawlessness of the janizaries. The weakness
of the sultan and of his administrative machinery had allowed
these troops to gain an independent power that was a constant
danger to the government and to the people of the empire. 4 "1" Their
power had "become so great that they had more than once dethroned
a sultan. But while their power had increased, their efficiency
had decreased, they had lost a great amount of their martial
spirit, and they could no longer be trusted in the field against
a regularly organized army such as the European nations could
40. Eton: Survey, p. 282. Walpole gives a more detailed account
of the conditions here: "On the gulf of Scanderon, HutchuH
j»li, of Paras, with two hundred followers, has been declared
a rebel, and the cause of the most serious alarm to the gov-
ernment for forty years; he allows no one to pass through his
territory without exacting an enormous contribution. If a
ship anchors before Paras, he endeavors to make the crew pris-
oners, to take possession of the ship, and demands a ransom
of the ship, and demands a ransom for the people. This pasha
is without money, and has but a handful of men: yet the vizier
with 3000 troops, on his return through Asia Minor, is obliged
to make a grand detour in order to avoid too near an approach
to the domain of this rebel. The caravans coming from Asia
Minor to Aleppo are compelled to go a journey of fifteen days
out of their route that they may not pass through the terri-
tory of Ali."
--Walpole: Travels, p. 330.
41. "The wound in the monarchy, uncured and incurable, is the
power which the janizaries have of exciting sedition. It is
a power the more dangerous, as it is without control; and while
they continue to exist, the state contains in itself a source
of weakness and decay.
"
--7/alpole: Memoirs, p. 27.
4. 42present.
One of the conditions within the Empire which most surely
demanded reform was the discrimination between Christians and
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Musselmans. There was no attempt on the part of the Musselmai to
bring the Christian to his belief—he simply despised him, and
took advantage of him at every possible opportunity. The Turk
was not merely exalted above his subject as a conqueror, but he
considered himself still more highly elevated as the favorite
43of heaven; and he considered his authority, influence, powers
of mind, and force of arms, as proper objects of barter in affairs
between or against infidels, without regarding the action from a
moral point of view. 44 Pashas considered a pashalik with a large
number of Christian (or Jews) as of greatest value; because they
could oppress them and extort from them, with little danger that
the complaints of the infidels would reach the Porte; ^nd if
these complaints did reach the sultan, they did not seem in any
46
way to hurt the position of the governor. ilusselmen might
easily bring complaints to the e^r of the sultan, and they were
also protected in the provinces by the body of worthies who as-
sisted the governor.
TV) |n
A Christian might not kill a Mohammedan evenA self defense;
and if a Christian should strike a Mohammedan he was most comnonly
47
put to death on the spot or at least, ruined by fines. If a
42. "The soldiery, soon learning its power, set up and deposed
sultans as seemed good to it, and extorted heavy bribes from
each successive puppet of its choice. The unbounded exercise
of capricious power quickly led to license and corruption,
and the janizaries by degrees lost their martial character,
and could not be trusted as of old in the field. /. bribe
was of more consequence to them than a victory. . . .The
worst feature of all was their inefficient officering. Their
commanders were appointed not for merit, but in consideration
of bribes.
"
—Lane— Poole: Turkey, p. 206.
43. Eton: Survey, p. 13.
44. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 178.
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Mohammedan killed a Christian he was generally only fined. The
testimony of a Christian was little regarded in courts of justice;
at best two testimonies were considered as one, and were even
overborne by that of a single Musselrnan, if he were reputed to
be at all an honest man. Christians could build no new church,
nor could they without great sums obtain the license even to
48
repair the old one. The distinction between Christian and Mo-
hammedan was carried to so great a length that even matters of
49dress were made a subject of restriction.
While this discrimination caused much evil
?
it must be re-
membered that the matter was not all one-sided. The Turkish
government was one most tolerant of religions, and at this time
it was something of a privilege to be allowed to worship as one
pleased. Then Christians were not excluded entirely from office,
although positions as bankers, merchants, collectors, farmers of
50
revenue, etc. were the highest they could obtain. The Turks
disdained the details of business and for that reason allowed the
Christians to handle these affairs. However, to profess Islam
has always been a high road to honors, and therefore many aban-
doned Christianity. Many of these converts became conservative,
and opposed reforras^and were fanatical in their loyalty to the
45. Christians and Jews were grouped together, as they all paid
the capit ation tax, and they were generally known as ray c T\ s.
46. Miller: Ottoman .Empire, p. 17.
47. luton: Survey, p. 99.
48. Eton: Survey, p. 100.
49. Ibid., p. 98. .Eton claimed that the Christians had to wear
dark colors and paint their houses dark, and that they were
liable to death for violation of these rules. This statement
is possibly exaggerated.
50. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 300.
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prophet. Many of the so-called "Turks" who were the worst per-
secutors of the Christians, were- not lurks at all but were con-
51
verted Christians.
The discrimination, then, was a matter entirely of religion,
end not of race; but it was one of the matters that was earliest
recognized by broad minded men of the empire as demanding reform.
51. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 21.
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Chapter IV.
Previous Attempts at Reform in Turkey
In undertaking the study of any reform movement it is first
necessary to define clearly what we mean by "reform." Throughout
the history of the Ottoman Empire we find those people who de-
sired reform divided between two interpretations of the word:
the majority wanted a return to the old methods of warfare and
administration that had made for the glorious period of the em-
pire—an extermination of the abuses and laxity which had crept
into the old system; but others, of whom Selim III was a con-
spicuous example, desired a complete change in the system, to
conform with the standards of the more advanced European nations.
The glory and prestige of the Empire had reached its height
under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520—-1566 ) . Since that time
there had been a degeneration in the administration of the Em-
pire, a decline in its prestige, and a disintegration of its power.
This decline was not unnoticed by the sultans, and various of them
made attempts at reform, their ideas of which were usually to
bring everything back to the glorious conditions of Suleimen's
time. Osman II (1618—1622 J determined to destroy the janizaries,
who had grown too formidable, had become mutinous, and were in-
terfering with the government, and to substitute a new army made
up of Kurls, and to make the militia more efficient; but his plans
were opposed by the Janizaries, who had power enough to depose
him. 1
1. Eton: Survey, p. 152.
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Probably the most noted, the broadest minded and the most success-
ful of the reformers were the four Kiuprilis, who were the
grand viziers furing the period from 1656 to 1702, a time in which
there were few strong sultans and the viziers had practical con-
trol of the empire. The first Kiuprili, Mohammed, was of Alban-
ian descent and had risen gradually to his position. He was
cruel and relentless, but he had great firmness of character
and common sense, and was very active. He introduced adminis-
trative reforms, quelled provincial revolts, revived the naval
strength somewhat, and fortified the Dardanelles and other
2
places. His son /.hmed succeeded him and was vizier from 1661
to 1675. /hmed Kiuprili has been considered by some the great-
est statesman of his country. He was stern, but unusually hu-
mane, and was a military leader. He repressed insurrection and
disorder, maintained justice and good government, and restored
a certain amount of the financial and military strength to the
empire. 3 Zadeh Must&pha, the "third niuprili" was called to the
vizierate in 1689. The thirteen years intervening between his
rule and that of his brother had been a period of disorder and
decline. His prudent measures reestablished some degree of order
in the army and the fleet, and he placed in the most important
pashaliks governors on whom he could rely. Hut highest praise
has been given to him because "he had the wisdom to recognize
the necessity of the Sublime Porte strengthening itself by win-
ning the loyal affections of its christian subjects
1
]
4 He saw
2. ureasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 33
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that the various Christian peoples were rising and joining chris-
tian invaders; and he gave orders against the oppression of
rayali
s
and allowed new and larger churches to "be "built. The
fourth Kiuprili, Hussein, made an effort to take advantage of the
peace after Xarlowitz and introduce order in the country, but
his efforts were unavailing; he was even driven from office, and
the sultan, who had sustained him, was forced to abdicate.^
It was not until in the course of the eighteenth century,
however, that great attempts were made to reform along the line
of introducing western methods and ideas. In this century the
name of Cazi Hassan stands out prominently. Hassan became cap -
udan pasha , or commanding admiral of the naval forces, in 1773.
"He employed all the influence which his official and personal
character gave him, and which, under Sultan Abdul Hamid, was
almost unlimited, to introduce various reforms into the Turkish
navy; and, had he been properly seconded, would have certainly
raised it to a considerable importance. The reforms and im-
provements which this great man introduced were very comprehen-
sive, and included the construction of vessels, the education of
officers, and the supplying of trained seamen. Aided by an Eng-
lish shipbuilder, Hassan entirely altered the cumbrous rigging
of the Turkish ships, and equipped them after the English system.
Then he compelled the commanders to attend personally to the good
3. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p.
4. Ibid., 77.
5. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 451.
6. Eton; Survey, p. 79.
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n
order and efficiency of their ships and crews; and in 1776 at-
tempted to establish a college at Constantinople for the regular
Q
education of young men as officers for the navy. H'e collected
all the good soldiers that he could from Algiers and various
seaports, to man the ships, and he endeavored to keep a suffi-
cient body of able seamen always reedy at Constantinople to man
Q
the fleet in any emergency. J reform which Hassan attempted and
which seems to be quite modern was in the matter of the abolition
of the use of liquor by the sailors. "Before his appointment as
High Admiral, the Turkish marines used to commit the greatest
excesses whenever they were ordered to embark on a cruize. . . •
He determined to abolish this licentious practice, and succeeded
in compelling them to go unarmed, whenever they were allowed to
be on shore, and even then only in small parties. ... He ordered
the doors of all taverns and wine shops to be sealed during the
time his fleet was in any port; and if he then found a seaman
drunk, he first made him confess where he had procured the liquor;
he then punished the wine seller." 10
During the first part of his career Hassan was quite suc-
cessful in the command. He was sent to recover for the sultan
some of the provinces which had recently revolted. "He defeated
the forces of Sheikh Tahir in Syria, besieged him in /ere, cap-
tured that important city, and reduced the district around it to
7. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 268.
8. Eton: Survey, p. 84.
9. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 268.
10. vYalpole: Travels, p. 57.
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temporary obedience to the Porte. 11 He had similar success in
the Morea.
He tried to improve the army, but found all his attempts
ineffectual. When he saw that it was impossible to discipline
the army, and had given up all hope of it, he proposed a new or-
der of battle. 12 But opposition to Hassan was growing and it
was in his array reforms that he had the least success. The grand
vizier and oti-ar great officers of the Porte were fearful of
seeing the grand admiral with so great a force constantly at his
13
disposal in the city, and were constantly desiring his downfall.
Their opportunity came when Hassan was no longer successful.
He had been put in command of the armies that were defeated- by
the Kussians in 1789, and the excitement and tension was so
great that Selim could only appease the multitude by putting to
14
death the gallant, but lately unsuccessful veteran, Gazi HaBsan.
Throughout the last half of the eighteenth century the
French, in pursuance of their policy to maintain the strength
of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, as counterweights against the
Hapsburgs and the Tsars, made attempts to improve the military
and naval strength of the Turks. It is reported that in 1775
there was a considerable number of French officers in Constanti-
nople, still remaining in the pay of their own court, zealously
engaged in the introduction of military reforms, and assisting
11. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 269.
12. Eton: Survey, p. 68.
13. Ibid., 84.
14. Creas£: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 296.
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Hassan in his attempts to improve the navy. 15 Baron de Tott,
a skilled engineer and a man of general ability was perhaps the
most prominent. He had been invited to come to Constantinople
by the sultan, and he had been given considerable power over the
machine was erected for masting vessels, a new foundry for can-
non was built, a body of artillerymen was instituted, and forts
were erected on the Bosphorus to secure the psssage to the Black
Sea. Another frenchman, a shipbuilder, by the name of Le Brun
1 7
also aided Hassan in the reform of shipbuilding.
15. Kanke: Servia, p. 97.
16. Davey: Sultan and Subjects, p. 159.
17. Thornton, Present State, I.
array and the fleet. 16 It was upon De Tott's suggestion that a
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Chapter V
The Reforms of Selim III
Selira III ascended the throne then, at a time when e desire
for reform, especially in the direction of westernizing the army
and navy, was beginning to be pretty generally felt in the em-
pire.^ "He was a young man of considerable abilities and high
spirit; and his people gladly hailed the accession of a youthful
prince, active in person, and energetic in manner, under whom
they hoped to see an auspicious turn given to the long declining
fortunes of the empire. Selim had been treated by his uncle,
the late sultan, v/ith far greater kindness, and had been allowed
much more freedom both bodily and mental, than the nonreigning
princes of the blood-royal were usually permitted to enjoy. One
of his intimate associates was an Italian physician, named Lorenzo
and from him and other Franks, Selim eagerly sought and obtained
information respecting the nations of western Europe, their civil
and military institutions, and the causes of that superiority
which they had indisputably acquired over the Ottomans. Selim
even opened a correspondence with the French king and his minis-
ters vergennes and Montmorin, in which he sought political in-
struction from the chiefs of what he was taught to regard as the
foremost nation of the Franks. He felt keenly the abuses which
prevailed in his own country, and it is said that his father,
l.'x'his description by Greasy of the character and ideals of Se-
lim is so good and so well stated that I have taken the liberty
to quote it word for word.
/
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Sultan Mustapha III, had bequeathed him a memorial, (diligently
studied and venerated by young Selim), in which the principal
events of Mustapha 1 s unhappy reign were reviewed, the degeneracy
of the Turkish nation discussed, and the great evils that pre-
vailed in the state were pointed out, with exhortations to their
thorough removal.
"Thus trained and influenced, Selim came, an ardent re-
former, to the throne; but the war which he found raging between
his empire and the confederate powers of Austria and Russia, re-
quired all his attention in the beginning of his reign, which
opened with the darkest scenes of calamity and defeat." Selim
welcomed peace as an opportunity of carrying out the reforms,
of which he realized the urgent necessity.
To correct the evils of state he projected changes in al-
most all the administrative departments. He curtailed the power
of the vizier somewhat by requiring him to consult the divan;
, 2
and the divan was reorganized. attempts were made to reform the
financial administration. The form of the budget was changed;
an attempt was made to abolish the farming of taxes and an excise
tax was imposed to meet the additional expense of the military
4
reforms.
Matters of provincial government occupied much of Selim'
s
attention. He abolished feudalism and strengthened the govern-
X. ureasy: Ottoman Turks, II, pp. 294-295.
2. Ibid., 331.
3. Encyclopedia Britannic^, XXVII, p. 431.
4. Thornton: Present State, II, p. 50.

merit by somewhat curtailing the powers of the pashas. One of
his greatest efforts was directed toward regaining control of
the power in Egypt. Efforts to subdue the rebellious Serbs led
to the final uprising which caused Selim' s downfall.
Selim encouraged the advance of education. He patronized
5
schools, especially those in Greece, and frequently visited
the college at Sulitza which had been established for the edu-
cation of array engineers. Printing establishments were revived,
and many French books were translated into the Turkish language
and printed. L French professor was appointed at Sulttza, and
in the library there were placed many French books, among which
was the Encyclopedie. Selim permitted M. de. Verninac, the En-
voy of the French Republic, to establish, in 1795, a weekly
newspaper in the French language --of which some twenty numbers
were actually published. This was not very successful , but it
7
marks the first attempt to establish journalism in Turkey.
Selim III realized the advantage of diplomatic intercourse
with other nations a.nd he sought to establish permanent embassies
Q
in the courts of all the great nations of Europe. This was a
step which Turkey had been very slow in taking, because of her
great prejudice against Christian peoples.
In matters of defense and the navy Selim attempted to carry
forward the work of the great Gazi Hassan. He had done himself
5. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 33.
6. Ranke: Servia, p. 98. .
7. DciVey: Sultan and Subjects, p. 16E. /hmed Emin: Development
of Turkey, p. 28.
8. Eton: Survey, p. 190.
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and the nation a great wrong when he had allowed himself to "be
influenced into executing this capable reformer. After peb.ce
was concluded with Russia in 1792, the sultan purchased model
ships from England, employed French shipbuilders, and construct-
ed a number of new vessels. He employed an English general at
Ismael to improve the fortresses, and to help organize a corps
9
of engineers. He also temporarily cleared away the Bulgarian
and Macedonian brigands, and the pirates in the Aegean.
But the direction to which the great efforts of Selim's
life were given was to reforms in the military force of the em-
pire. He knew that an efficient army was necessary to maintain
his other reforms, and to regain the prestige of Turkey, or. even
to maintain her present position. Soon after the close of the
war with Russia Selim began to introduce changes. The people
hoped to see him, like a sultan of old, take the field at the
head of the janizaries and spahis , and overthrow his enemies, in
accordance with the holy books and recognized Mussselman ideas.
Selim, however, perceived that the cause of his country's disas-
ters lay in the superiority of the military resources of his
enemies, and their experience in the art of war; and he resolved
to assimilate their methods into the Turkish army, as far as pos
sible. A change in the system of government, which was intro
duced under the name of nizami djedid . or new constitution, was
effected by three ministers, the secretary for foreign affairs,
9. Ranke: Servia, p. 98.
10. Miller: Ottoman Empire, p. 19.
11. Ranke: Servia, p. 96.
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the minister of the war department, and the steward of the dowager
empress. The avowed object of the institution was the augmenta-
tion of the standing army, to "be disciplined according to the ap-
proved system of European tactics, and supported by the imposition
. . 12
of new taxes.
An interesting story is related as to how Selim first came
to be interested in western military methods. -.s this has been
retold by several modern writers, perhaps it is worth repeating
here. "The grand vizier, in the late Kussian war, had a prisoner
who was by birth a Turk, but being carried early in his youth
to Moscow, he had become Christian, and found in a Russian no-
bleman a patron who gave him a good education and placed him in
the army. He was a lieutenant when he was taken prisoner, and
had the reputation of being a good officer. The vizier took
pleasure in conversing with him. He represented the advantages
of European discipline, not only in battle, but in ma.ny other
points of view, and particularly in securing the army from mutiny.
By his persuasion the vizier formed a small corps, composed of
renegadoes and a few indigent Turks, to whom the prisoner taught
the European exercise, which they used to perform before the
vizier's tent to divert him. Peace being concluded, the vizier
returned to Constantinople and conducted this little corps with
him. They were left at a village a few leagues from the capital.
The sultan, learning of them, went to see how the infidels fought
battles, as he would have gone to a puppet show; but he was so
12. Thornton: Present State, I, p. 149.
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struck with the superiority of their fire, that from th.*t in-
stant he resolved to introduce the European discipline into the
army and abolish the janizaries. This step, as might he expect-
ed, produced a mutiny which was only appeased by the sultan's
consenting to continue them their pay during their life times,
but at the same time /ordered that no recruits should be received
13into their corps. This incident, if true, may have been re-
sponsible for increasing the sultan's determination to introduce
western methods, but his first realization had undoubtedly come
in his study before he became sultan, and through his contact
with European soldiers in his first Kussian war.
The new troops, which 7/ere known as nizams were affiliated
with the janizaries so as to disarm the jealousy of the latter,
14
and were properly drilled and given a distinctive uniform. In
1804 Selim organized the artillery and placed it on a footing
of privilege superior to that of the janizaries. nd in 1805 he
decreed that the finest youth of the empire should be taken, even
15
from the janizaries themselves, and enrolled. among the nizams .
The total number of new troops raised in and near Constantinople
1
6
was 14,000, and in Asia about 60,000. The new troops are said
to have lacked confidence in the European discipline and not to
17
have had the enthusiasm of the janizaries.
Selim remodjed the whole system of artillery; he adopted
13. Told by Eton: Survey, p. 92. Retold and apparently credited
by Creasy and Kanke.
14. Encyclopedia hritannica, XXVII, p. 454.
15. Cambridge Modern History, IX, p. 384.
16. Clarke: Travels, Part 2, Sect. 1, Vol. Ill, p. 375.
17. Eton: Survey, p. 94.

the dimensions of the French cannon, especially for field pieces
He established military schools, with skilled European instruct-
ors. His reforms were thorough-going in scope, but little ef-
fective.
18. Ranke: Servia, p. 98.
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Chapter VI
Opposition to Reforms
At the very first Sultan Selim's newly instituted militia
was in every respect a success; it grew in numbers and there
was some hope for a growth in popularity. But the sultan was
working in the midst of possibilities of strong opposition from
every side.
Numerous causes worked toward the failure of the various
projected reforms. The janizaries and corrupt officials and the
provincial rulers were fundamentally opposed to the schemes,
and the conservatives joined with them against reforms of Euro-
.
.
1
pean origin. The excise which had been levied to support the new
troops and improvements, had advanced the price of tobacco and
other luxuries and some necessities and this caused universal com-
p
plaint and discontent.
Selim failed partly because he lacked what a reforming
prince requires, the assistance and support of the lower and
unprivileged classes. The sultan was unable to enforce his or-
ders that the janizaries should be disciplined according to the
European system. He could only have done this by making war
against the provinces in which these rebellious troops held
sway. But he could not use the support of the provincials, or
at any rate of the provincial rayahs against the janizaries > be-
1. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 455.
2. Clarke: Travels, part 2, Sect. 1, Vol. Ill, p. 376.
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cause of the religious nature of the problem. On the contrary,
he was forced to maintain a constant warfare on these and even
to support the janizaries against the rayahs . Such of his Mo-
hammedan subjects as he had been able to organize were insuf-
ficient to effect his object.
The conservative and fanatical spirit of the uleraa was one
of the greatest obstacles to progress and reform. 4 A writer
at the beginning of Selim's reforms said: "To introduce a unity
into the government this ambitious body should be wholly extir-
5
pated." The ulema opposed the projects from the narrow re-
ligious poiat of view and it was probably because of this that
they were so actively engaged in the project to place the
fanatically orthodox Mustapha on the throne.
Prom 1802 to 1806 there was no European war, but it was not
a period of tranquillity for the Turkish Empire. The Wahabites
continued their conquests, and in 1802 they captured Mecca and
Medina, so that all Arabia was now in their possession. The loss
of the Holy Cities, and the manner in which the Wahabites treat-
ed the Mohammedan sanctuaries ,excited a profound sensation through
out the Ottoman Empire and tended to prejudice the Turkish part of
the population against their innovating sultan, whose reign was
7
marked by such visitations.
In 1804 there was a serious outbreak in idrianople, whither
3. Ranke : Servia, p. 217.
4. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 427.
5. Eton: Survey, p. 36.
6. Davey: Sultan and Subjects, p. 162.
7. Creasy: Ottoman Turks, II, p. 346.
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20,000 of the new troops had been sent, ostensibly to put down
the revolt in Servia, but really to try to bring about the re-
form of the European provinces. So strong was the opposition
that the troops were recalled and the anti-reform party was great-
3ly strengthened.
The final defeat of Sultan Selim was brought about by a
combination of the small independent-feeling nationalities who
were supported by outside powers, the rebellious janizaries,
and the religious authorities, the ul ema .
In 1806 the rayahs of Servia, galled by the oppression of
the janizaries and encouraged by promises of help from Russia,
rose under Kara George and Milosch Obrenovitch, and foiled a
plot of the janizaries for general massacre and captured some of
the Turkish strongholds. The revolt was directed at first only
against the turbulent janizaries, but Selim could not side with
the Christians against the Musselmen, so he arrested the Chris-
tian leaders and ordered a loyal pasha to disarm the whole pop-
ulation. But the Christians refused to surrender; Kara G-eorge
defeated the pasha, and the Servians drove back the Turkish
9
forces and captured Belgrade.
In the meantime the French ambassador had been urging an
alliance of Turkey and France, and had urged Turkey to keep
a tight hold on Wallachia and Moldavia, where the Russian right
of interference had resulted almost in Russian rule. In order
8. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXVII, p. 455.
9. Cambridge Modern History, p. 387.
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to do this Selim deposed the reigning hospodars. The Tsar con-
sidered this a declaration of war and sent troops into these
10
provinces.
So at this difficult moment the army was forced to march to
the Danube, leaving the government in the hands of men hostile
to reform. And the janizaries, instead of fighting, directed
their efforts to routing the nizams . They met the new troops
in frequent battles and were victorious. The colonel of the
janizaries was raised to be grand vizier, but peace was not re-
stored. 11
In 1807 the garrisons of the Black Sea forts at the entrance
to the streits, rose in rebellion and killed their officers. The
sultan sought to appease them by pacific means, but the first
step taken against them excited open rebellion against him in
his capital. The janizaries overturned their camp kettles as
an intimation that they would no longer accept food from Sultan
12
Selim. They insisted on the abolition of the new troops; but
even this concession did not satisfy them.
The enemies of the government pointed out that deposition
was the only means of quieting things. The number of janizaries
was increased on the pretense of some revolt and the aggression
of Russia. The rebels in a body demanded of the mufti an order
of death for those they marked, and the ministers who had sanc-
tioned the innovations in the army were executed. The barracks
10. Cambridge Modern History, p. 388.
11. Clarke : Travels, Part 2, Sect. I, Vol. Ill, p. 376.
12. Ranke: Servia, p. 218.

56.
13
of the new troops were destroyed and a general massacre began.
The next duy the mob went to the palace and insisted on the de-
position of Selim. The iauft
i
then declared the sultan dethroned,
"for having abandoned himself to Christian vices, and violated
the holy ordinances of the Koran.
13. Clarke: Travels, Part 2, Sect. I, Vol. Ill, p. 376.
14. Ranke : Servia, p. 219.
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Chapter VII
Results and Outlook at iind of Reign of Selira III
But Sultan Selim' s efforts, defeated as they were by the
reactionary forces of the empire, were not without results. The
rebels who deposed hi Tn put his conservative cousin Must^pha on
the throne; however, Mustapha's rule was short-lived. There was
a truce with Russia, and Bairactar, Pasha of Rustchuk, marched
to the capital to restore Selim. But Selim was murdered by one
of Mustapha's eunuchs. However another cousin, Mahmud II, who
had equal foresight and even greater ability than Selim
;
was
placed on the throne; and his character and firmness allowed him
in the course of time, to carry out many of Selim' s reforms.
The reforms of Selim III paved the way for his successors,
and a new era was opened. It is true that Turkey has since then
suffered many defeats and revolts, she has lost armies, fleets,
and provinces, but a new spirit has been shown by her rulers
and statesmen, which, though it has often been seriously checked,
yet has never been entirely extinguished. Turkey has proven
1 2false the confident prediction of Volney, Eton and other writers
at the close of the eighteenth century, that her power, at least
in Europe, was soon to be completely wiped out.
1. "The sultan equally affected with the same ignorance as his
people, will continue to vegetate in his palace; women and
eunuchs will continue to appoint to offices and places; and
governments will be publicly offered to sale. The pashas will
pillage the subjects, and impoverish the provinces. The di-
van will follow its maxims of haughtiness and intolerance. The
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The independence of certain governors continued and in-
creased, and one "by one, during the next century, various of
the nationalities broke away from the jurisdiction of the Otto-
man power. But much was accomplished during the nineteenth cen-
tury. Feudalism was completely wiped out; Llahmud finally de-
stroyed the janizaries, and an army drilled and generalled accord-
ing to western ideas has "been built up; the artillery and forti-
fications have been modernized; the financial administration has
been reorganized, and general education has been encouraged, with
the result of very greatly improving social and economic condi-
tions. The "sick old man from the last" is not yet gone; Turkey
still maintains a foot-hold in Europe and is still to be reckoned
with among the powers.
1. (Continued) people will be instigated by fanaticism. The gen-
erals will carry on war without intelligence, and continue to
lose battles, until this incoherent edifice of power, shaken
to its basis, deprived of its support, and losing its equili-
brium, shall fall, and astonish the world with another instance
of mighty ruin."
—Quoted from Volney by Thornton: Present State, II, p. 10
2. "That Turkey must very soon be overwhelmed by the empress, ap-
pears from a comparison of her financial resources, her army
and her marine, with those of the Ottoman power. Constantinople
itself cannot be considered as a tenable post, and when the
disaffection of the enslaved Greeks is taken into the account,
little doubt can be maintained that the followers of Mohammed
will be entirely driven from the countries in Europe which
they have usurped, whether England consent or not It
is scarcely to be doubted that another war, conducted on simi-
lar principles (like those that ended in 1774 and 1792), must
totally extinguish the Turkish power from Europe.
--Eton: Survey, p. 422 and p. 187.
(Written 1795 or 1796. )
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"Turkey in Europe "
London
1906
A valuable uuuk on modern Turkey, which does not
contain much that relates to this period.
Eton, W.
,
"Survey of the Turkish Empire "
London
1801
.
This book contains valuable detailed information,
but is inclined to be prejudiced against Turkey
in any matter in which Russia is in any way con-

60.
Eton, W. , (Continued)
cerned. The title page calls the book, "A Sur-
vey of the Turkish Empire, in which are consi-
dered: I. Its government, finances, military and
naval force, religion, history, arts, sciences,
manners, commerce, and population. II. The state
of the provinces including the subjection of
the Greeks, their efforts toward emancipation. . •
III. The causes of the decline of Turkey, and those
which tend to the prolongation of its existence
with a development of the political system of the
late empress of Russia. IV. The Eritish commerce
with Russia, etc.— By W. Eton, many years a res-
ident in Turkey and in Russia. " In the preface
he says: "I reason only from facts. . . . and I
speak of countries in which I have been long res-
ident, and events to many of which I have been
witness. ... In Turkey I have been consul; I
have had indirect concerns in trade; and as a
traveller I have visited most parts of the Empire."
Hamlin, Cyrus,
"i.mong the Turks"
New York
1877
The author was an /merican missionary and teacher
in Turkey— the first president of Robert College.
The book contains a little that applies to this
period.
Ives, Edward,
"A Journey from Persia to Snglandyete.
London
1773
The writer was surgeon in India, and resigned and
travelled home overland. He describes many trans-
actions at which he was present, and he was on
acute observer.
Porter, Sir James,
"Observatinns on Religion, Law, etc. of the Turks "
London
.
1768
This author was a diplomatist and was sent as am-
bassador to Constantinople in 1746.
Porter, Robert Ker,
"Travels in Georgia, Persia, Armenia, etc."
London
1822
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Porter, Robert Ker, (Continued)
The author^a painter and traveller. In 1817 he
took a trip south from St. Petersburg into Turk-
ish territory.
Thornton, Thomas,
"Present State of Turkey"
London
1809
Two Volumes
Title page— "The Present State of Turkey or a
description of the political, civil, and relig-
ious, constitution, government and laws of the
Ottoman Empire; the finances, military, and
naval establishments; the state of learning and
of the liberal and mechanical arts; the manners
and domestic economy of the Turks and other sub-
jects of the grand seignor; etc. etc.
,
together
with the geographical, political and civil state
of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia—
-
from observations made, during a residence of
fifteen years in Constantinople and the Turkish
provinces"
The author is familiar with prominent writers on
the subject and disagrees with a great many of
their statements, especially with those of Mr.
Eton, "Thornton possessed an intimate knov/ledge
of his subject, both from his long residence at
Constantinople, and from his friendship with the
European ambassadors. His work is a valuable
contemporary study of the Ottoman Empire."
—dictionary of National Biography.
Walpole, Robert,
"Memoirs Relating to Turkey"
London
1818
"Travels in Various Countries of the East."
London
1820
Journals, letters, or detached essays—"Remarks
as presented to the mind on the spot and subjects
supplemented by reading, etc."
The book seems to be a collection of various and
unrelated extracts taken from the author's own
observations and from the journals, letters, etc.
of other travellers.
"Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832"
~-by an /-merican.
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New York
1833
Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardj'i,
Translation in
Holland, T. E.
"The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey"
London
1877
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SECONDLY
Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed.
Cambridge, 1911
'rticle, "Turkey"
Vol. XXVII, pp. 4E6--467
Cambridge Modern History
Chapter on "Continental System," by J. H. Rose
Vol. IX, pp. 385—389
Barton, James L.
,
"Daybreak in Turkey"
Boston
1908
A discussion merely from the standpoint of mission-
ary efforts.
Creasy,
"History of the Ottoman Turks"
England
1854
In two volumes
The author has made a careful study of Von Hammer--
also has sought information from Montecuculi, Roe, Von
Hamper, D'CJissow, Thornton, Porter, and others.
Von Hammer's -Long residence in the East and his
familiarity with the institutions and habits and
literature give value to his work. But the work
was not a mere abridgment of Von Hammer. A most
valuable secondary history.
Davey, Richard,
"The Sultan and His Subjects"
London,
1897
In two volumes
A vivid description of peoples and places and
customs.
i'reeman, Edward A.
,
"Ottoman Power in Europe"
London
1877
Jorga, N.
"Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches"
Gotha
1913
Volume V
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Lane—Poole, Stanley,
"Story of Turkey"
New York
1897
This gives the "main outlines of Turkish history."
Clearness and "brevity were the author's main con-
siderations. Generally considered the best short
history of Turkey in English.
Lybyer, A. H.
"The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time
of Suleiman the Magnificent"
Cambridge
1913
Miller, Wm.
,
"The Ottoman Empire, 1800—1913"
Cambridge
1913
One of a series "intended for the use of all per-
sons anxious to understand the nature of existing
political consitions." The work was based on or-
iginal documents when possible and was the result
of many years study on the Eastern question. Deals
more with the Balkcn States than with Turkey.
Monroe, W. S.
,
"Turkey and the Turks"
London
1908
Ranke, Leopold,
"History of Servia"
Translated from the German by
Mrs. Alexander Kerr
London
1848
The purpose of the book is to excite the nations
of Europe in behalf of the Servians and other Chris-
tians who were or had been under Turkish rule. Nat-
urally, thf-^efore, it is prejudiced against Turkey,
but it contains much valuable information, especially
on the subject of the reception of the reforms of
Selim, and the forces that caused his overthrow.
Fortnightly Review
"A Study of Reform in Turkey"
New York
1897
Vol 67—pp. 639-659
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This is a rather careful study of nineteenth cen-
tury reform in Turkey, but it simply mentioned Se
lim, and really begins with the work of Mahmud.
I!
I


